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ABSTRACT 
 
Africa’s wave of democratisation since 1990 has transformed political institutions in the region.  
But while democracy is a desirable end in itself, considerable doubts remain about whether it is 
contributing to better development outcomes.  This study investigates the impact of political 
constraints on electricity generating capacity, using cross-national data for 46 sub-Saharan 
African countries. It tests the hypothesis that institutions that restrain arbitrary executive 
authority result in higher levels of electricity generating capacity. The hypothesis is informed by 
the theory of credible commitment.  This theory holds that political constraints provide a stable 
political and policy environment that reduces temptations for governments to renege on their 
commitments.  Credible commitments are especially important in attracting investment with a 
long gestation period, such as investment in electricity generating capacity. In my method I use a 
combination of statistical analysis and nested case studies to probe the congruence of these 
outcomes with my hypothesis. For the nested analysis I use the statistically chosen countries of 
Rwanda and Kenya, which in themselves conform to the pattern of the hypothesis. My central 
finding is that the presence of democratic political institutions has led to improved electricity 
generating outcomes in African states. In this way the study contributes to the understanding of 
the developmental consequences of democratisation in Africa. 
  
9 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s1 lag in the generation of electricity has been blamed for halting the 
progress of socio and economic development in the region. Foreign investors conducting 
business in the region have facetiously described the situation as one of “bring-your-own-
infrastructure.” 2 Underlying this statement is the fact that the region’s electricity shortages 
translate into higher costs when doing business in Africa. The electricity crisis has been 
attributed to various factors notably Africa’s political instability. Africa’s political landscape is 
an assortment of political regimes and institutions resulting from the legacy of the recent wave of 
democratisation in the 1990s. This variation in polity has been interpreted as a high political risk 
factor for investors and has subsequently deterred potential investment into the region and 
especially into long gestation and high cost projects such as electricity generation.
3
  
The central problem lies in there being a lack of credibility amongst African governments to 
honour their commitments in the long term horizon, therefore bringing forward the problem of 
credible commitment. The problem of credible commitment arises where an actor has an 
unrestrained power in their decision-making capacity and as such can use their discretion to 
make arbitrary decisions to: expropriate, change the terms of an agreement or renege on 
contractual commitments in the future.  Credible commitment is particularly pronounced in 
utility sectors such as electricity since investment into these sectors is resource intensive and 
once made cannot be easily withdrawn by investors should a government renege.
4
 The 
underlying logic of credible commitment informs us that private investment is unlikely to take 
                                                          
1
Note: for the remainder of this paper I will refer to this as “Africa”. 
2
 The Economist. “Lighting a Dark Continent.” The Economist, 27 September 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21620245-power-shortages-have-been-holding-africa-
back-are-last-easing-lighting . 
3
 Sebastien Marlier.  “Investing in African Infrastructure.” The Economist Intelligence Unit, 16 September 2014, 
http://www.economistinsights.com/infrastructure-cities/opinion/investing-in-african-infrastructure 
4
 Bergara,Mario, Henisz J. Witold, Pablo T. Spiller,”Political Institutions and Electric Utility Investment: A Cross 
Nation Analysis,” California Management Review, 40, no.2 (1998): 19-20. 
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place where there is a lack of institutions or enforcement mechanisms that can place limits on the 
state’s ability to renege on commitments.5 
In Africa, the state-making and institution-building process under democracy has been varied. 
Much of the democratisation which has taken place in the region was externally imposed leading 
to the legitimacy of the African state and its institutions being challenged. African states are seen 
as having the framework of democracy and political institutions, however they are lacking in its 
substantive matter for various reasons.
6
 As such the region’s political institutions vary in their 
level of efficiency and ability to act as checks and balances on executive behaviour. Considering 
all of the above, this research report is concerned with answering the following question: 
Since the introduction of democracy in 1990, do democracies in Africa provide a better 
investment environment, with the potential to lead to higher electricity generating 
capacity, than non-democracies? 
This question follows the logic that in a country where there are democratic political institutions 
in place, the executive of that country will be constrained in its decision-making activities. This 
gives the executive credibility when it concludes agreements and is a feature which attracts 
investors into projects such as generation. The expected outcome then becomes higher outputs of 
generating capacity in a country with political constraints in place.  
To carry out this research, I use a combination of statistical analysis and nested case study 
design.
7
 The statistical analysis will test for the plausibility that a relationship exists between the 
political constraints of a country and its electricity generating capacity, using a cross-national 
data sample of 46 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The second component is the nested analysis 
which allows me to delve deeper into the unique traits of each case country to trace the extent to 
which the relationship between the dependent and independent variable exists. This is a powerful 
method that brings together the strength of statistical analysis to make inferences about larger 
sets of data and the richness of case study analysis to trace specific nuances. I also make use of 
                                                          
5
Ibid, 18-20. 
6
 Patrick Chabal and  Jean-Pascal Daloz. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. (Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1999), 4.  
7
 Evan S. Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Analysis.” American Political 
Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): 435–52, http://0-www.jstor.org.innopac.wits.ac.za/stable/ 
pdfplus/30038950.pdf  
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the statistical analysis as the foundation to choose Rwanda and Kenya as my cases for 
comparative study.  
My research is important for the broader debate on democracy and development because it 
zooms in specifically on the Africa region. It acknowledges that because it was one of the last 
regions to have undergone democratisation, there is a high likelihood for political regime 
variation. Africa’s varied political landscape also offers a good natural platform to test the 
widely made assumption that democracy is essential for development. The research covers the 
time period 1990 through 2011, which is important for two reasons. First it traces the start at 
which many countries transitioned into democracy and experienced the initial political instability 
resulting from teething pains. Secondly because this is a lengthy time period the process to 
political and institutional consolidation in the various countries is accounted for. This research 
also picks up on an earlier study conducted by Bergara et al in 1998.
 8
 Their study finds a 
positive association between the presence of political institutions and electricity generating 
capacity for a worldwide sample based on data ranging from 1987-1994.
9
  
The examination of the relationship between the institutional endowments of a country and the 
resulting impact this has on investment into generating capacity, forms part of a greater 
discussion on the developmental consequences of democratisation on the continent. It is hoped 
that this study will contribute some insights into the democracy and development discussion, 
especially with regards to development in the energy sector in Africa. This is one of the sectors 
that has been identified as impeding further economic growth on the continent due to the 
inadequate and unreliable electricity supply in the region. 
The remainder of this paper is set out so that chapter two provides a high level overview of the 
literature central to this discussion. Chapter three presents the conceptual measures used in the 
study and sets out the statistical analysis component of the paper. Chapters four and five discuss 
the nested case studies of Rwanda and Kenya, these lead into the discussion of the significance 
of the findings and observations made in the study. Finally, chapter seven gives a brief 
conclusion.  
 
                                                          
8
 Mario E. Bergara et al, op cit. 
9
 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CREDIBLE COMMITMENT EFFECT 
 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical and causal approach which I have adopted 
to guide my study. I will also use this chapter to explore the various literatures around my 
theoretical approach, highlighting those which help to hold up or challenge my theory.  
Democracy and its inherent political institutions have long been touted as the pillars of 
development in the international development discourse. This is mainly attributed to the belief 
that these instruments are able to induce a level of accountability upon the actions of a 
government operating in the public sphere. In Africa, however the instruments of democracy and 
political institutions of restraint are relatively new, as the region has only recently undergone a 
wave of democratisation. Accordingly the region has countries which are at various levels of 
democratisation and the consolidation of political institutions (if at all present). This 
heterogeneous political landscape raises concerns over the political risk for those interested in 
investing in the region. Investors are challenged by the uncertainty of whether or not their 
investments into the region, especially those made into utilities, are safe from the expropriation 
and arbitrary decision-making of governments. With the region rapidly growing and increasingly 
being considered as a favourable destination for international investment, it is important to tease 
out the ideas of political institutions and the extent to which they are able to make African 
governments credible to potential investment partners.  
 
 
CREDIBLE COMMITMENT AND UNCERTAINTY 
One of the main issues arising from the investment discourse is that of uncertainty. Investors 
have an uncertainty over the safety of their investments from peremptory changes by the 
government over the long term of their investment.  As such I adopt a theoretical approach that at 
its core deals with the issue of uncertainty in the investment transaction process. Such a theory is 
13 | P a g e  
 
that of credible commitment which was initially introduced by Oliver Williamson under the 
school of the new institutional economics.
 10
 He first raised the theory in response to the problem 
of the incomplete knowledge and unforeseen inter-temporal contingencies that actors 
experienced in the firm when they were making contracts.
11
 Williamson’s theory has 
increasingly gained use in the political economy discourse through scholars such as North and 
Weingast.
12
 
The theory of credible commitment can be said to have emerged out of the need to answer the 
basic question: “How to bind players to agreements across time and space.”13 In order for society 
to function optimally there needs to be a level of trust amongst the actors within the society, as 
well as established boundaries of interaction. Commitment enables trust and the creation of those 
boundaries, as it is a promise or pledge of intent to behave within a certain manner consistently. 
Commitment alone however is insufficient to guarantee behaviour, what is most valuable is a 
commitment that is reliable and one in which actors have the security that it will be carried out. 
Such a commitment is known as a credible commitment. According to Shepsle commitments are 
said to be credible in one of two scenarios: the motivational and the imperative.
14
  
Motivational commitments are characterised by the following features: actors willingly commit 
to an agreement of their own accord, they follow through with the terms of the agreement at the 
time of performance and they do not renege on the contract agreement irrespective of the 
conditions ex post.
15
 Commitments are credible in the imperative sense when actors commit to 
an agreement and act in line with it as a result of there being an external binding or enforcing 
mechanism which ensures compliance, even if the temptation to renege arises.
16
 I highlight this 
distinction in the credible commitment literature to show that there are various accepted 
conditions on what leads to credible commitment. This research paper concentrates on credible 
                                                          
10
 Oliver Williamson. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. (New York: The Free Press, 1985). 
11
 Ibid, 10. 
12
 North and Weingast develop the credible commitment theory in a political economy context in their 1989 paper 
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century 
England. The paper looks at the Institutional Revolution of 17
th
 Century England. 
13
 Douglass North. “Institutions and Credible Commitment.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 
(1993),11. 
14
 Kenneth A. Shepsle. “Discretion, Institutions and the Problem of Government Commitment,” Social Theory for a 
Changing Society (eds) Pierre Bourdieu and James S. Coleman. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1991) 
15
 Shepsle and Pitcher. 
16
 Ibid. 
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commitment in the imperative sense and raises political institutions of restraint
17
 as the external 
force limiting the discretion of actors and temptation to renege.  
 
 
APPLICATION OF CREDIBLE COMMITMENT THEORY TO THE STUDY 
This study takes as its starting point the hypothesis that the presence of political constraints 
within a country creates an environment of predictability and reliability, in which the 
government is made credible to potential investors. As such the independent variable identified 
in this study is political constraints and the dependent variable is electricity generating capacity.  
The causal diagram below shows the hypothesised relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables in this study. Starting from the left, the political institutions of restraint 
(political constraints) within a country are what provide the framework within which exchanges 
of economic activity such as doing business and making investments amongst multiple 
stakeholders can take place.
18
 Where the institutions are: independent, resilient to arbitrary 
changes and are able to constrain the opportunistic behavior of governments, then an 
environment of credible commitment exists. Credible commitment implies that government and 
policy-makers get into agreements in which they will not renege, as they are conditioned into 
cooperation by the enforcing institutional mechanisms.
19
 Where credible commitments exist the 
transaction costs of doing business or investing into large sunk projects are reduced and the 
market is made attractive to investors who will invest in the otherwise high risk sectors, this in 
turn has a positive effect on infrastructure development such as the electricity generating 
capacity.
20
  
                                                          
17
 Note: For the remainder of this paper I will refer to this as “political constraints”. 
18
 Bergara et al, op cit, 18. 
19
Douglass, North 1984. “Transaction Costs, Institutions and Economic History.” (in) The New Institutional 
Economic: A Collection of Articles from the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. Turbingen: J.C.B 
Mohr, p.204. 
20
 Bergara et al, op cit, 20. 
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The current literature on the theory is divided into two areas: that which holds that institutions 
enhance credible commitment therefore creating an accountability mechanism between the state, 
citizens and investors. The second area of discussion is that institutions diminish credible 
commitment or have very little impact upon it. 
 
Institutions enhance credible commitment 
The credible commitment theory emphasises the role that political institutions play in 
constraining the unlimited power that a government or executive has within a country and the 
decision-making process.
21
 North and Weingast in their eminent work on institutions argue that 
for a society to develop, the state’s power must be constrained and furthermore political 
institutions such as: an independent judiciary, legislature and parliament are the mechanisms by 
which to achieve this.
 22
   
Leading on from the foundations set by North and Weingast, Henisz develops a practically 
useful index to measure the political constraints capacity of a country. In his index, Henisz 
specifically outlines the following characteristics of institutions that will lead to credibility 
within a polity: there must be several independent branches of government in place, within the 
government branches a system of veto points needs to be in place and finally the government 
                                                          
21
 Douglass North, 1984, 204.  
22
 Douglass North and Barry Weingast.  “Constitutions and Commitments.” The Journal of Economic History 49, no 
4 (1989): 803-832. 
Figure 1: Causal diagram of the credible commitment effect 
Institutions 
of political 
restraint 
Credible 
commitment 
to investors 
Electricity 
generating 
capacity 
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needs to be made up of a heterogenous composition of political parties.
23
 I make use of Henisz’s 
index within the study.  
A country can theoretically have in place all the institutions which are said to lead to credibility; 
however this is not very useful if the application thereof does not exist de facto. In this context, I 
acknowledge Douglass North who raises the distinction that for institutions to be credible they 
must exist in both a formal and informal format.
24
  The formal represents the rules made and the 
informal refers to the norms around the rules; essentially does the state’s behaviour conform to 
the prescriptions of the institutions that have been set in place?  
Within the discussion on credible commitment one of the tensions that exist is that of what type 
of political environment is most conducive to the outcome of a credible government. Since this 
study deals explicitly with an African sample in which there is a wide variation of regime types, 
this is a markedly important point to consider. Pitcher offers an interesting extension to the 
theory by adding to the discussion that regime type and the nature of party politics within a 
country matter.
 25
 Pitcher argues that regime type and the party system interact with the existing 
institutional mechanisms and together impact upon the effectiveness of institutions and their 
ability to create credibility.
26
 Her theory is rooted in the democratic tradition whereby a country 
which has a high democratic quality and established institutions is more likely to be constrained 
by institutional rules and norms.
27
 On the other hand a country with a low democratic quality but 
also having established institutions is less likely to allow itself to be constrained by institutions 
and the executive might use its discretion more arbitrarily.
28
 
Consistent with the fact that many African states have only recently undergone democratisation 
is that these states are subsequently at different levels of democratic maturity and consolidation. 
Collier and Hoeffler like Pitcher promote sound democratic institutions as a means to realising 
credible commitment. They make a distinction between procedural democracy and a strong 
democracy: a strong democracy is one in which the presence of political institutions actively 
                                                          
23
Witold J. Henisz. “The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure in Investment.” Industrial and Corporate 
Change 11, no2: 355-389.  
24
 Douglass North, 1993, op cit.  
25
 Anne Pitcher. “Party Politics and Economic Reform in Africa’s Democracies.” (New York: Cambridge University 
Press,1999.) 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid, 4.  
28
 Ibid, 4-5. 
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provides checks and balances.
29
 They believe that these types of institutions only exist in a 
mature democracy.
30
 Their contribution to the discussion is that the types of institutions that 
matter and are able to give rise to credibility and attract investment are those which have been 
developed over time and can therefore legitimately constrain executive discretion. Recently 
democratised African states might in this case struggle to qualify as meaningful democracies 
with strong institutional checks and balances. Van de Walle and Masaki come to similar 
conclusions in their study of the impact of democracy on economic growth and investment 
patterns in sub-Saharan Africa between 1982 and 2012.
31
  
With regards to specifically linking the credible commitment theory with development, Alence 
makes the argument that democratic institutions enable development through the alignment of 
the executive’s immediate interests with the long term developmental needs of a country.32 He 
treats the institutions as not being valuable in themselves but rather they are the linkage between 
the government and developmental outcomes.  
 
Institutions that diminish credible commitment 
In opposition to the ability of political institutions to induce government credibility and 
subsequently promote development lie two key inter-related arguments. First is that of the 
developmental state and the second argument is that of the prevalence of the neo-patrimonial 
state.  
Good governance coupled with sound political institutions has long been promoted as a pre-
condition for economic growth in developing states. These constructs are said to create a stable, 
hospitable and credible environment for donors and investors to invest into the developing world. 
Contrary to this is the approach of the developmental state which advocates for a type of 
governance that is highly centralised. The developmental state is characterised by: a strong 
                                                          
29
 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. “Testing the Neocon Agenda: Democracies in Resource-rich Societies.” European 
Economic Review, 53 (2009), 299. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Van de Walle, N and Masaki, T., 2014, The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Wider Working Paper  2014/057. 
32
 Rod Alence. “Political Institutions and Developmental Governance in sub-Saharan Africa.” Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 42 no.2 (2004): 165. 
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leader (or political regime) with an absolute hold over power, a government that typically has 
long-term view and pursues pro-capitalist policies.
33
 In Africa, there already exist a few 
countries pursuing this mode of development with varying outcomes; such countries include 
Kagame’s Rwanda and Ethiopia. Mkandawire has also made the argument that the idea of the 
developmental state is not new to Africa and the region has in the past had authoritarian 
developmental states, although there is now a tendency to speak of democratic developmental 
states such as Botswana and Mauritius.
34
 The Developmental state has been prescribed as an 
approach to development that may be helpful for developing states as was the case in South-East 
Asia.  
Another criticism against the viability of political institutions as leading to credible commitment 
and development takes the institutions themselves as the starting point. Weak institutions that 
lack the ability to enforce restraint or control over the state lend themselves towards being the 
political instrument of the executive. This type of thinking alludes to the work of Chabal and 
Daloz who have advocated for the idea that the state in Africa has not been properly 
institutionalised.
35
  States in Africa have adopted the framework and systems of traditional 
institutions associated with democracy however they have continued to run their patron networks 
within them.
36
 As a result the principle of the rule of law has not been embedded nor adhered to 
in the African state. Politicians also use their discretion freely in decision-making and generally 
fail to distinguish between the private and public life, often redistributing public resources to 
personal gain. In such a situation the presence of institutions fails to create an environment of 
credible commitment, instead the institutions operate as a façade of true democratic tradition. 
Considering the varied interpretation of institutionalism that exists in African states post-1990, 
Chabal and Daloz contribute an argument worth considering in scope of this paper.  
                                                          
33
 Tim Kelsall et al. “Developmental Patrimonialism: Questioning the Orthodoxy on Political Governance and 
Economic Progress in Africa.” Africa Power and Politics. (London, Overseas Development Institute, 2010.) 
34
 Thandika Mkwandawire. “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 25 
(2001): 310. 
35
 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz. “W(h)ither the State.” in Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. 
(Indiana: Indiana University Press,1999.) 
36
 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz. “W(h)ither the State.” in Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. 
(Indiana: Indiana University Press,1999.) 
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Though not disregarding the value of political institutions for development entirely, Bates 
disputes the potential of these as having the ability to lead to government credibility.
37
 His view 
is that political reform and the presence of political institutions might as a minimum introduce 
positive outcomes in government spending on public goods but overall democracy actually leads 
to greater political instability.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explained the credible commitment theory and shown its usefulness as the 
theoretical approach to be used within this study. Furthermore, the chapter also highlights the 
tension that exists in accepting a default position that political institutions of restraint and 
credible commitment lead to development outcomes. Throughout my analysis of the case studies, 
I will also make use of the key arguments raised by the literature. In chapter three, I set out the 
method used in the study and present the findings from the cross-national statistical analysis, 
before discussing the countries selected for the case study analysis.  
 
  
                                                          
37
 Robert Bates.   “Institutions and Development.” Journal of African Economies 15, no.1 (2006): 10-61.  
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CHAPTER III 
IMPACT OF POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON GENERATING CAPACITY 
 
Over the two decades since 1990, African states have continued to be varied in their democratic 
and political features. This variation provides an interesting test for the hypothesis that countries 
with political constraints are able to attract investment into development infrastructure such as 
the generating capacity sector. The aim of this chapter is to set out the method and concept 
measures of my study and ultimately to analyse the empirical relationship that exists between 
political institutions and electricity generating capacity, whilst controlling for other variables. I 
conclude the chapter with the case selection for the nested case study. 
 
 
CONCEPTS AND MEASURES 
In this section I introduce and explain the variables used in the regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is the generating capacity of a country whilst the independent variable is the 
political constraints of a country. The regression analysis looks at the impact that the presence of 
political constraints has on generating capacity, whilst controlling for certain variables. 
I have adopted a mixed methods approach in this study which includes an initial cross-national 
statistical analysis using a sample of 46 sub-Saharan African countries.
38
 The empirical analysis 
is useful for the identification of an initial relationship between the political constraints variable 
and electricity generating capacity variable. Apart from providing an initial trend in the data, the 
outcomes of the statistical analysis are also used to make a selection of cases for the qualitative 
research component of my paper. The case study is intended to trace the extent of the association 
between the two variables in the case countries. By using this approach, I am able to provide a 
richer study that not only reveals the nature of the relationship between political institutions and 
                                                          
38
 Owing to a lack of data on the newly formed South Sudan and Somalia for the time period under review, I have 
excluded Somalia and included only Sudan in the study. 
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electricity generating capacity in Africa but one that also reveals specific trends and features 
when considered in the context of a case country. 
 
Dependent variable: generating capacity 
The dependent variable for this study is the electricity generating capacity in 2011, measured 
using kilowatt-hours (kWh) per capita. I use the premise that investments lead to increases in 
generating capacity therefore a lack in investments would lead to a decline in the generating 
capacity of a country. The converse is true for an incline in investments. I control for the effects 
of generating capacity circa 1990 therefore any changes that occur in the study period 1990-2011 
on the generating capacity are indicative of the investment patterns taking place during that time 
only. Taking this into consideration, I conclude that the generating capacity is a measure of a 
country’s ability to attract investment into the generation sector of that country. Thus the 
generating capacity variable is also seen as a proxy measure to illustrate the changes in 
investment taking place into the electricity generation of a country.  
Using electricity generating capacity is especially challenging for the investment discussion 
because electricity exhibits features of development infrastructure that make it hard to attract 
investment. First, the type of equipment required in the sector is large and sunk, once invested it 
is hard to move or withdraw from a country.
39
 Second, generating capacity is on a large scale and 
is widely consumed within a country, both features which make the sector highly politicised and 
vulnerable to government expropriation.
40
 In the African context the power sector has 
traditionally been under the control of the state therefore predisposing it to politicisation. Other 
development infrastructure sectors that could be equally considered include water and 
telecommunications, as was done by Levy and Spiller.
41
 
                                                          
39
 Bergara et al, op cit, 19. 
40
 Ibid. 
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The measure used in this study is the logarithm of total electricity net generation in kWh per 
capita for the year 2011. The data is sourced from the US Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) database.
42
 
 
Independent variable: political constraints  
Institutions are the formal and informal rules designed to constrain the potentially self-interested 
behaviour of individuals, especially those within decision-making positions.
43
 Built into the 
institutional framework are procedures which identify deviation from the rules and enforcement 
mechanisms with which to respond to or prevent deviation.
44
 Institutions are the tools by which 
society and individual actors can realise the gains from their economic activities because they 
give rise to: property rights, create enforcement mechanisms to protect these rights and their 
presence is likely to lead to credible commitment. 
In the political sciences, political institutions are understood to refer specifically to the presence 
of an executive, legislature and judiciary framework. Apart from these features this study is also 
concerned with: the level of independence that each of these frameworks has and the resulting 
veto power that they have in order to place political constraints on leaders. To be independent 
institutions need: to be separate from the executive as a minimum, there needs to be a varied 
party composition of the members within these institutions and the interests of these parties 
should not be aligned to those of the executive.
45
 
There are several instruments available to measure the polity of a country, I use the Political 
Constraint Index designed by Witold Henisz (Polcon III).
46
 This index measures the restraints 
that are placed on the executive authority of a country by the political and institutional 
mechanisms in place.
47
 In order to do this, the index looks at the number of independent 
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branches of government (the executive and legislature) and how much power of veto each has.
48
 
The index also looks at the degree of heterogeneity of the political parties that sit within each 
branch of government and considers whether these parties are aligned to the government or not. 
Institutions with a high party composition that is aligned to the government, reduces the veto 
power of those institutions and makes policy change by leaders more likely.
49
 Alence writes that 
the limitations that are placed on a government “become more restrictive as the veto players’ 
political affiliations and those of the executive diverge.” 50 
In the study I use Henisz’s index to divide my sample of African countries into two groups: those 
in which the political and institutional restraints placed on the executive over the period 1990-
2011 had a meaningful effect and those which did not. I do this in a two step process: first I look 
at the individual Polcon III score of a country for each year since 1990, countries meeting a 
minimum threshold of 0.1 are coded as having meaningful constraints in place and those failing 
to meet the threshold are coded as having zero constraints in place. Secondly, I average the 
scores for each country over the twenty-two year period to find a value between 0-1. This value 
represents the proportion of years during the study period that a country has had political 
constraints in place. The proportionate measure is then used as the independent variable in my 
study. Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa are all countries that score one 
whilst Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia and Sudan are shown as having zero political 
constraints over the entire period.  
 
Control variables 
I measure the relationship between the dependent and independent variable whilst also 
controlling for the possible effect that other factors might have on the relationship. My interest is 
to trace the extent to which political constraints affect generating capacity of a country, since the 
nature of the observed world is such that other factors are also at play and may influence 
electricity generating capacity performance as well as the presence of political constraints. I 
control for these other eventualities, helping to identify a clearer causal link between the 
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variables. In the research I control for: generating capacity in kWh per capita circa 1990 
(logarithm), GDP per capita circa 1990 (logarithm), the population circa 1990 (logarithm) and 
the hydroelectric power potential of a country. The data for these indicators was sourced from 
the World Bank Development Indicators database.
51
  
Africa’s generating capacity is mainly comprised of hydroelectric power and fossil fuels 
although other sources of renewable energy are currently being explored and are starting to 
make-up a higher percentage of the energy mix in African countries. I control for the role that 
hydroelectric power potential could play in electricity generating capacity as it is a natural 
endowment that the high presence of within a country could lead to higher generation (if 
captured), versus a country that lacks that potential. The hydroelectric power electricity data is 
sourced from a 2008 study by Pokhrel et al in billion kWh which I then covert to kWh per 
capita.
52
 
 
 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The regression analysis whilst taking into consideration the effects of other variables reveals that 
there is a positive association between the presence of political constraints and changes in the 
generating capacity output of a country.  
 
Relationship between political institutions and generating capacity  
Table 1 shows the results of the various regression models run for this study.  In column 1 of the 
table the bivariate relationship between the political constraints and 2011 generating capacity 
indicates a positive association with a high coefficient value of 0.94. The association does not 
however explain a lot of variance in the model since the R-squared value is a low 0.03. The 
second column adds the electricity generating capacity circa 1990 to the original bivariate 
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regression. The effect of this addition is that the political constraints coefficient is pushed up to 
1.04, confirming a strong association between the constraints and generating capacity. The 
variable also pushes up the adjusted R-squared value from 0.03 to 0.59, indicating that the 
second regression model has a high explanatory power. The implication of this drastically 
positive change is that political constraints do a good job in accounting for the changes taking 
place in the generating capacity over 1990 through 2011. A country that had high generating 
capacity prior to 1990 is also more likely to develop political constraints and subsequently 
improve generating capacity. 
In the third column, the addition of the GDP variable has a negative impact upon the coefficient 
bringing it down to 0.82 but the regression model remains statistically significant. The 
explanatory power of this model is also slightly increased to 0.64. This implies that countries 
which had a high GDP prior to the study period are likely to develop political constraints and 
expand their generating capacity over the period 1990 through 2011. The population circa 1990 
variable in the fourth column  and the hydro potential in column 5 effect very little change upon 
the overall model coefficients and R-squared.  
Taking everything into account, the regression models depicted in Table 1 (especially column 5) 
show that there is a distinctly positive relationship between the political constraints of a country 
and the generating capacity outcomes of that country. The results remained consistently positive 
even when controlling for the effect of other variables such as: GDP per capita, total population 
and electricity generating capacity prior to the study period. The results are thus consistent with 
the hypothesis that countries with political constraints induce credibility in their government, 
helping it to make credible commitments to investors and expand generating capacity. I will now 
proceed to use the regression model outcomes from column 5 in table 1 to demonstrate what the 
association looks like graphically and with the sample of countries.  
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                                               Generating capacity (log, 2011)         
                                        (1)     (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Political constraints                  0.94     1.04**   0.82**   0.82*    0.82*   
                                      (0.64)   (0.41)   (0.40)   (0.41)   (0.41)  
                                                                                  
Generating capacity (log, circa 1990)           0.64***  0.49***  0.49***  0.47***  
                                               (0.08)   (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.11)  
                                                                                  
GDP per capita (log, circa 1990)                         0.50**   0.50**   0.48**  
                                                        (0.20)   (0.20)   (0.21)  
                                                                                  
Population (log, circa 1990)                                      0.01     0.02   
                                                                 (0.09)   (0.10)  
                                                                                  
Hydroelectric power potential                                              0.06 
                                                                          (0.10)  
                                                                                  
Constant                               4.51***  1.50*** -1.39    -1.53    -0.67   
                                      (0.40)   (0.47)   (1.24)   (2.08)   (2.51)  
                                                                                  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                            46       46       46       46       46    
R2                                     0.05     0.61     0.66     0.66     0.66   
Adjusted R2                            0.03     0.59     0.63     0.62     0.62   
Residual Std. Error                    1.49     0.97     0.91     0.92     0.93   
F Statistic                            2.18   33.28*** 26.89*** 19.70*** 15.60*** 
================================================================================= 
Note:                                                 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 1: Regression Estimates of the effects of political constraints on generating capacity 
(1990-2011) 
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Figure 2: Regression plot showing the association between political constraints and 
electricity generating capacity per capita (2011) 
 
Figure 2 is a partial scatter plot showing the relationship between the political constraints and 
generating capacity, whilst taking into account the control variables of the study. Since the 
scatter plot is a graphical representation of the regression model in column 5 of Table 1, the 
slope of the graph corresponds with the model’s coefficient of 0.82. The slope is turned upwards 
towards the right hand corner, indicative of the highly positive association between the variables. 
The slope also indicates that countries which have had longer periods with political constraints in 
place will have larger increases in their generating capacity.  
The countries in the plot are spread relatively evenly below and above the fitted line. Fitting the 
model precisely are Senegal (SEN) and Tanzania (TZA), with other countries such as Swaziland 
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(SWA), Gabon (GBN), Liberia (LBR), Eritrea (ERI) and Zambia (ZMB) being very closely 
related to the fitted line.  
There are also several outliers in the scatter plot. Botswana (BWA) for example has performed 
well on its political constraints (matching Senegal that is on the fitted line) however, it has 
experienced very little growth in its generating capacity. Botswana’s performance can be 
partially explained by the fact that the country has few sources of energy of its own to exploit 
and so it imports substantial amounts of electricity from other countries, notably South Africa. 
Mozambique (MOZ) is also an extreme outlier to the top right corner of the plot. The country’s 
rate of growth in generating capacity far exceeds its expected level, taking into consideration the 
country’s political constraint’s index. The performance of Mozambique can be explained by the 
fact that the country generates high levels of electricity mainly for export and not use within the 
country. Mozambique has various foreign investor stakeholder groups who have invested in 
generating capacity in the country with the explicit purpose to exploit the rich hydro sources for 
export and not development of the country itself. Such investor profiles may not hold the same 
level of political risk concerns as typical investors looking to set up a market within the country. 
Mozambique despite being the third largest generator of electricity in the region in 2011 only has 
an electrification rate of approximately 15 per cent.
53
 Even when the outliers: Mozambique and 
Cape Verde (CPV) were excluded from the regression model, the slope still remained positive 
indicating that these countries are not the only drivers of the relationship between electricity 
generation and political constraints. 
Figure 3 takes into consideration the outcomes of the regression estimates and seeks to explain 
what the estimates say about the effects of political constraints on generating capacity in a 
sample of African states between 1990 and 2011. To do this the graph simulates the electricity 
generation capacity of two hypothetical African countries. It holds all other variables constant 
and assumes a difference only on political constraints. One of the countries has had political 
constraints over the entire period under review, whilst the other country has had no political 
constraints in place throughout the entire same period. These countries both start in 1990 with a 
generating capacity of approximately 100 kWh per capita; however what will their outcomes 
reflect after more than two decades? 
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Figure 3: Regression-based simulation graph of the effects of political constraints on 
generating capacity in two typical African countries 
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The top panel in Figure 3 shows the results of the simulation exercise. There are two density 
curves in the graph;
54
 each of them is made up of the results of 10 000 simulations and the curves 
peak where the simulation outcomes are most concentrated.
55
 The dotted curve on the left 
represents the African country which all being equal had no political constraints in place and it 
peaks at approximately 97 kWh per capita. This indicates that a country with no political 
constraints in place fails to improve its generating capacity over time and may even regress in its 
generating capacity output. The solid graph on the right hand side represents the African country 
which had political constraints throughout the 22 year period. This curve peaks at 221 kWh per 
capita, indicating a more than doubling effect in the generating capacity of that country’s 
performance. The graph shows that a country with political constraints performs more than two 
times better in its generating capacity over time than a country without any political constraints.   
The second panel in Figure 3 represents the same information as in panel 1. The single density 
curve is the result of the difference of means test taken using the difference between the curves 
in panel 1, which represent the African country without political constraints and the country with 
political constraints. This new curve peaks at approximately 124 kWh per capita, which is also 
the difference in the means of the two countries. The grey shaded area on the curve in panel 2 
represents the region in which the probability that democracy does not help improve generating 
capacity is true. This grey area accounts for only 1 per cent of all the simulations, which means 
that we can be 99 per cent confident that the presence of political constraints improves a 
country’s generating capacity.  
The empirical results from this study enable me to reject the null hypothesis and concur with the 
hypothesis that political institutions which enforce constraints on the political actors of a country 
play a positive role in increasing the level of electricity generating capacity within a country. 
Since the generating capacity variable is a proxy for investment performance into a country, the 
results also enforce the idea that African countries that have undergone democratisation 
outperform their authoritarian counterparts with regards to attracting investment into the 
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electricity generating sector. More broadly these findings are important in highlighting the value 
of democracy and political institutions in Africa, which have long being criticised as ineffectual 
and as a façade masking political patron networks.
56
 The fact that countries with political 
institutions of restraint outperform those without, challenges the school that rejects the value of 
democracy in Africa. Finally the findings in the quantitative analysis update those of the Bergara 
et al worldwide study, by confirming that the causal relationship which exists between the 
presence of political institutions and electricity generating capacity holds in sub-Saharan Africa 
too.  
The statistical analysis in my study is useful for making the more generalized claim: institutions 
of political restraint impact on electricity generation capacity in Africa. This claim will be further 
strengthened through the use of a nested analysis to trace the direct causal relationship amongst 
the variables.  
 
 
NESTED ANALYSIS AND CASE SELECTION 
For the rest of my study I move away from the abstraction that is represented by the statistical 
analysis towards real-world application of the observed relationship between my variables. I use 
the statistical analysis to choose two cases which fit the profile of the countries examined in the 
simulation to test the theory. Rwanda is a country that has lacked political constraints for most of 
the years from 1990 through 2011. It is similar to the simulated case of an African country with 
no constraints in place. Kenya on the other hand has had political constraints in place for most of 
the same period; as such it is similar to an African country that has had full constraints. Given 
that the statistical analysis shows us that a country with a greater proportion of years with 
constraints will see greater improvements in generating capacity over time, we expect that Kenya 
will outperform Rwanda. Figure 2 in fact shows this to be the case. In Figure 2 Kenya (KEN) 
and Rwanda (RWA) are both near-the-line cases which have between them a similar slope as 
that of the fitted line in the graph. A calculation of the data itself indicates that over the period 
1990-2011, Kenya managed to improve its generating capacity by 30.54 per cent and Rwanda 
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improved its generation by only 15.02 per cent. This is consistent with the statistical outcomes 
which predict that a country with a greater proportion of years with political constraints in place 
is likely to perform two times better than a country without.  
Moving into a comparative case study of the two selected countries enables me to trace the 
extent to which the outcomes of my hypothesis are valid: do political constraints really make it 
easier for governments to overcome the problem of credible commitment and subsequently 
attract investors? The comparison between Kenya and Rwanda is especially interesting because 
Kenya is a weak democracy with an endemic corruption problem. Conversely Rwanda is a 
highly centralised state with a developmental executive. My hypothesis predicts that Kenya 
should find it easier to attract investors than Rwanda however the developmental characteristics 
of the country are in themselves attractive to potential investors.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The remainder of this paper seeks to provide answers for these questions. Chapters four and five 
provide the comparative case study analysis, whilst chapter six is a discussion of the findings. 
This is followed by a brief conclusion in chapter seven.   
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CHAPTER IV  
RWANDA, A CASE OF AUTHORITARIAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
This chapter introduces the first of the case study countries Rwanda. From the statistical analysis 
outcomes Rwanda is shown as having only moderately improved its generating capacity over the 
study period. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the progression of both the political 
constraints and electricity generating capacity in the country, in order to understand if the 
country’s performance is in congruence with the hypothesis that political constraints lead to 
higher generating capacity outcomes. The chapter begins with a brief country overview, followed 
by an analysis of the country’s political landscape through 1990-2011 and then an assessment of 
the electricity generation sector.  
 
 
COUNTRY OVERVIEW AND HISTORY 
Rwanda is a former Belgian colony which gained its independence in 1962. The landlocked 
country is situated between central and east Africa, and is a member of the East African 
Community (EAC). Rwanda is poorly endowed with natural resources, making it heavily reliant 
on the agricultural sector as a significant income generator (31 per cent of GDP) with tea and 
coffee being two of the country’s most successful exports.57 The country has also been plagued 
by deep ethnic tensions between two of the three main tribes: Hutu and Tutsi. In 1994 tensions 
reached climax, when almost 1 million people were killed in the Rwandan Genocide. During the 
country’s Civil War and devastating Genocide, much of the country’s infrastructure was 
damaged and destroyed, leading to poor economic performance and the exacerbation of poverty. 
Post-conflict however the country has shown a remarkable turnaround through steady flows of 
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foreign aid and national strategy planning. Despite its successes, access to electricity remains a 
serious challenge and it negatively affects the prospects of further economic development.  
A great portion of Rwanda’s political history has been tied up with ethnic divisions. Prior to the 
country’s independence, Hutu militia killed thousands of Tutsis and overthrew the ruling Tutsi 
king in what has been called the Hutu Peasant Revolution.
58
 This set the tone for the continued 
animosity that would exist between the two groups. Rwanda’s first elected president at 
independence, Gregoire Kayibanda was a member of the majority Hutu tribe, he was deposed of 
through a coup d’état orchestrated by the military. 59 Juvenal Habyarimana of the National 
Republican Movement of Democracy (MRND) was then instated as the new president in 1973.
60
 
The new Hutu based government used ethnicity to consolidate its power and to discredit the 
Tutsi, especially those who held positions of power and formed part of the opposition. 
Furthermore, the Habyarimana government appointed only Hutus into government, subsequently 
sidelining the Tutsi and their political interests.  
The oppression and violence against the Tutsi forced many members of the ethnic group to flee 
the country into neighbouring Uganda. Whilst in Uganda, the Tutsi mobilised together to form 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) with the stated aim to re-instate displaced Tutsis in Rwanda 
and to push for a moderate political rule, which would include both Tutsi and Hutu members.  
 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN RWANDA 
Rwanda has undergone deep political turmoil and the country’s political experience can be 
summed up as: Rwanda undergoing conflict and Rwanda recovering from conflict. This is the 
case as the incidence of violence has deeply characterised much of the country’s political 
condition. 
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Political conditions of the 1990s 
On 1 October 1990 the RPF launched attacks targeting Hutu civilians and the government. This 
marked the beginning of Civil War in Rwanda. By 1993, the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) and the United Nations (UN) had managed to convene meetings with both the RPF and 
MRND, which led to a power-sharing and peace agreement under the Arusha Accord.
61
 Peace 
had been barely agreed to when the country was plunged into genocide on 6 April.
62
 It is 
believed that the genocide was triggered by the assassination of president Habyarimana on his 
return to Rwanda from Tanzania. Civil War and genocide marked the political instability of the 
early 1990s in Rwanda. Inevitably during this time, the political institutional structure of the 
country was almost non-existent as a result of nearly two decades of authoritarian and violent 
rule. Any fragments of political institutions that were adopted at independence were also 
eventually destroyed through the on-going conflict. 
The end of the genocide saw the RPF assume power under Pasteur Bizimungu and it established 
a transitional government which would be referred to as the Government of National Unity 
(GNU).
63
 The GNU was tasked with the project of bringing peace between the warring factions 
and reconciliation into the post-genocide country. The government was also intended to serve as 
a temporary transition government from authoritarian rule, towards multiparty democracy within 
the country. This transition was however drawn out over a decade, as the country only held its 
first multiparty elections in 2003, where Paul Kagame was voted into the presidency. 
The newly elected GNU was not without its challenges including an ill-experienced government 
which had little knowledge of the country, since the RPF party had been formed while in exile in 
Uganda and many of its members had never actually lived in Rwanda. The government was also 
faced with a collapsed institutional infrastructure resulting from years of conflict, coupled with a 
lack of social cohesion and a broken-down economy. The transitional government was however 
able to make political, economic and social gains through the assistance of the international 
community which has been instrumental in the country’s reconstruction.64 
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Alongside its successes, the RPF led unity government has also been widely accused of carrying 
out various human rights violations against: civilians, political leaders and genocide survivors 
who occupy positions of power. The period between 1995 and 1999 was marred by politically 
motivated arrests based on accusations of being genocidaires
65
 and assassinations orchestrated 
by the military.
66
 Writers on post-genocide Rwanda often cite these events as the early signs of 
the country heading towards a dictatorship.  
 
Political conditions from 2000 
2000 was a year of political crisis for Rwanda as three key members of the GNU resigned: the 
National Assembly speaker Joseph Sebarenzi, Prime Minister Pierre Celestin (who both fled the 
country) and president Bizimungu. Bizimungu was arrested on charges of political crimes and 
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment under Kagame’s presidency.67 His arrest followed hotly on 
the heels of the criticisms he made regarding the operation of the GNU and RPF. He was 
succeeded by the then prime minister Paul Kagame. 
In 2003 the country held its first multiparty presidential elections which were won by the 
incumbent Paul Kagame. International observers found the elections to be irregular and far from 
free and fair. In the lead up to the elections political parties were suppressed, whilst the two 
opposition parties: Parti Democratique pour le Renouveau Democratique (PDR) and the MDR 
were banned from running in the elections and their leaders were arrested.
68
  Kagame won the 
elections with an unsurprising landslide victory of 95.05 per cent of the vote, reflective of the 
political suppression taking place in the country.
69
 The second elections in 2010 followed much 
the same pattern as in 2003, leading political observers to describe Rwanda’s electoral process as 
a mere consolidation of Rwanda’s dictatorship.70 
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Although Rwanda theoretically made the transition to a multiparty democracy in 2003, the state 
behaves like an authoritarian regime.
71
Legitimate political opposition has been suppressed in the 
country through the banning of parties and the detaining or assassination of opposition leaders. 
The government also has a strong hold on the types of political parties forming, especially at the 
grassroots level, for fear of ethnically based mobilisation.
72
 The government has also used the 
fear of a relapse into the ethnic divisions that led to the 1994 genocide as a tool to repress 
opposing political views and to place restrictions on the type of political organisations allowed to 
mobilise. The political landscape in Rwanda has been definitively shaped by memories of the 
1994 genocide and the goal to prevent the recurrence of violence.  
Despite its lack of democratic political consolidation, the government of Rwanda has managed to 
re-build the nation and secure steady financial aid which accounts for almost half of the 
country’s budget. Under Kagame’s leadership, the country has favourably managed its fiscal 
policy and has set out several development initiatives, the most prominent being the country’s 
blueprint for national development Vision 2020. Vision 2020 represents the goal for what 
Rwandans envisage their country to be by 2020. The plan was designed through several 
consultations with various stakeholder groups including civil society from 1998 and its overall 
objectives are to build a middle-income Rwanda.
73
 The plan sets out 6 key pillars in order to 
achieve this:  
 National reconstruction following good governance principles; 
 Economic transformation of the country away from agricultural dependence towards a 
market economy; 
 Private sector development; 
 Promotion of tertiary sectors and skills development; 
 Infrastructure development; 
 Regional cooperation.74  
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Vision 2020 was formally rolled out in 2000 and has been important in showcasing the country’s 
commitment towards state-building. It has also been instrumental in showcasing Rwanda’s 
commitment to development and attracting donor aid into the country.                                                    
 
Political institutions 
Rwanda has undergone significant reconstruction in all areas of political life, including the 
establishment of new political institutions since the total collapse of political infrastructure in the 
country. The new 2003 constitution provides for the following institutions: an executive made up 
of a president and vice president with a 7 year term, a legislature made up of two branches (the 
senate with 26 seats and the chamber of deputies with 80 seats) and an independent judiciary in 
which the supreme court is the highest.
75
  
Although these institutions exist in theory, their effectiveness and adherence to by the executive 
is questionable. Kagame has supreme power over parliament in the decision making process, he 
can elect members into parliament, choose the Supreme Court judges and in legal matters of 
political interest the judiciary needs to consult him. The members of his RPF party also make up 
more than half of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, thus providing little political 
differentiation in parliament.
76
 Rwanda is highly centralised and since power emanates from the 
executive and not the political institutions that have been constitutionally set out. The 
government of Rwanda cannot be constrained in its actions by the country’s political institutions 
as they are empty vessels of power and enforcement mechanisms.  
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Figure 4: Political constraints ranking of Rwanda (1990-2011) 
 
Figure 4 captures Rwanda’s political constraints performance for each year from 1990-2011.77 
For most of the period (1990-2003) Rwanda was rated as having zero political constraints. This 
corresponds with the period of civil war under which the government could not exercise control 
over the state nor its institutions. It is only from 2004 that the country starts to record a higher 
political constraint index per year. On average throughout the entire period under examination, 
Rwanda has only had political constraints in place for approximately one third of the time; which 
is in contrast to the entire sub-Saharan Africa region which has on average had constraints in 
place for a little over half the period since 1990. 
Overall, the political performance of Rwanda emanates from a deeply violent and ethnically 
fragmented history. Only a few years after independence the country succumbed to almost three 
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decades of ethnic violence and authoritarian rule by a Hutu government. During this time the 
weak political institutions that were in place, served only to re-enforce the dominance of the 
Hutus and suppress Tutsi citizenship. The national unity government of Kagame which came to 
power through the genocide and war did not completely shed off the violent tendencies and 
ethnically based discrimination synonymous with the country’s history of governance. Although 
the country finally underwent multiparty democratic elections in 2003, these were not free or fair 
since in practice political opposition was barred from equally participating in the process. 
Rwanda’s political performance and institutional organisation raise several questions on the 
government’s overall ability for credible commitment. 
 
 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR OVERVIEW 
Rwanda has an extremely poor performance record when it comes to its electricity sector. 
Electricity only accounts for an estimated 5 per cent of the country’s total energy consumption 
and most of the country relies on wood fuel.
78
 The country’s electricity infrastructure is old, 
broken down and in some cases is completely destroyed as a result of past conflict. To aggravate 
the situation, electricity costs in Rwanda are excessively high due to the frequent use of oil 
generation plants. The country’s violent political history and under-developed state has meant 
that few private investors have been involved with the generation sector and the burden to fund 
the sector lies predominantly on the state.  
The Rwandan government is critically aware of the challenges in this sector and has prioritised 
the development of the electricity generating sector in the country, especially if the country is to 
accelerate its economic growth. Over the last five years, improvement can be seen in the 
performance of the sector and ambitious goals have been set by the government to increase 
generation and to connect more of its citizens to the grid. 
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Energy sources 
The electricity sector in Rwanda has been historically made up of hydroelectric power; this is 
due to the favourable hydrological conditions within the region as is also seen in the neighboring 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which has proposed to build the world’s largest 
hydroelectric power electric facility under the Grand Inga Dam Project. Over the years however 
additional sources of energy have been introduced into the country’s overall generation mix, 
including: thermal generation through oil, methane gas, geothermal capacity and a growing 
interest in the renewable energies sector including: biogas, peat, solar and wind power (though 
still in early stages of development).  
 
Figure 5: Graph showing Rwanda’s generating capacity by energy source ( GWh) 79 
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Hydroelectric power 
The primary source of electricity in Rwanda comes from hydro-electric power which accounts 
for approximately 59 per cent of the total energy mix.
80
 By 2011 Rwanda had five hydro power 
plant sources: Ntaruka, Mukungwa, Gihira, Gisengy and Rukarara.
 81
 In addition to this, the 
country imports hydro-electric power from the neighbouring Rusizi plant which it shares with 
the (DRC). Apart from these the country has also been able to harness the use of micro-hydro 
power under the PSP Hydro Project particularly for rural electrification.
82
 The abundance of 
rivers and availability of water in Rwanda makes hydro-electric power a natural option for the 
country however, it is also at high risk of drought. Over the period 2003-2005, Rwanda 
experienced extreme drought which saw the country default to oil generation as an immediate 
stop-gap solution to the energy shortages. Figure 5 shows the antithetical relationship between 
the two sources; as hydro-electric power drops from 0.116 GWh in 2003 to 0.065 GWh in 2005, 
oil usage increases from 0.003 GWh to 0.047 GWh over the same period. Incidents such as the 
drought have pushed the government of Rwanda to diversify its generating capacity sources. 
 
Thermal electric power 
Rwanda’s use of thermal power is mainly through oil generation plants which account for 
approximately 40 per cent of the country’s generation.83 Taking into consideration Figure 5, it 
shows that oil generation starts to take off only in 2000. This is a result of the government 
introducing oil generation plants as an emergency source during the years of drought. Although 
still a significant part of Rwanda’s energy mix, oil is not a sustainable source: Rwanda is not an 
oil producer and has to import its oil, since the country is landlocked it also has to absorb the 
high transport costs of bringing in the oil from Kenya’s Mombasa port as well as subsiding taxes 
on the imported it to ensure consumer affordability. Alongside the challenges mentioned above, 
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the high price volatility of oil and foreign currency cost further exacerbates the unsustainable 
reliance on it as an energy source for generating capacity. 
 
Geothermal electric power 
Like its EAC counterpart Kenya, Rwanda has also been estimated as having a high geothermal 
energy potential in excess of 700 MW annually.
84
 During the years 1990-2011 no geothermal 
power was brought on-stream, however studies had already revealed that potential for the energy 
source is concentrated in the countries northern region (Gisenyi, Kibuye and Cyangugu), which 
forms part of the Rift Valley in which volcanic activity contributes to the presence of geothermal 
energy.
85
 The main constraint in developing this energy source has been the high costs required 
in the exploration phase of the project as the discovery of reserves is not guaranteed. The country 
also has a shortage of skilled workers and experts (often having to entice home Western educated 
ex-patriates), thus making it challenging to carry out explorations and further develop the 
geothermal sector. Despite these challenges however, the government under the Energy, Water 
and Sewerage Authority (EWSA) has prioritised the further development of geothermal energy 
and has partnered with the Nordic Reykjavik Geothermal company to facilitate exploration of 
potential reserves which would then be passed over to potential investors or the state to 
develop.
86
 Although having partnered with the Nordic company, the costs of the project are 
being covered by the government of Rwanda.  
  
Methane Gas 
Methane gas is a unique and highly viable energy source for Rwanda, government-led studies 
have revealed that there is a potential 700 MW capacity of methane gas situated in Lake Kivu 
(which would have to be shared with the DRC).
87
 In 2009 the government of Rwanda and 
Contour Global (a private American based energy company) concluded the first IPP deal in 
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Rwanda under the KivuWatt Project. Kivuwatt would be the first of its kind energy project in 
Africa to generate electricity through the extraction of methane gas from beneath Lake Kivu 
(which borders on Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)).
 88
 KivuWatt is 
expected to generate a total of 100 MW of power and was to be developed in two phases: phase 
1 would supply 25 MW and phase 2 would supply 75 MW.
 89
 Phase 1 of the project has been 
financed by Contour Global, the Netherlands Development Finance Company, whilst the balance 
has been borrowed from the African Development Bank’s Emerging Africa Infrastructure 
Fund.
90
 The investment has also been protected from political risk through the World Bank’s 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
91
 The second phase of the project requires a 
further $260 million which has yet to be confirmed and has led to delays in project construction 
(which was scheduled for 2014). 
 
Electricity sector reforms 
Eberhard et al describe reform as the transition of enterprises that have been dominated by the 
state towards commercialisation, unbundling, privatisation and the creation of competition within 
a sector.
92
 Reform of the electricity sector has been advocated for its potential to improve 
efficiency by shifting responsibility away from the state and encouraging private sector 
participation. Like most electricity sectors in Africa, the sector in Rwanda has been dominated 
by the state however since the late 1990s steps towards increasing the independence and 
commercialisation of the sector have taken place. In 1999 management of the state utility was 
placed under a private international company Lahmayer in an attempt to improve efficiency and 
management of the sector,
93
 this lasted until 2008 when the management of the utility was 
relegated back to the government. The utility was then divided into Rwanda Energy Corporation 
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(RECO) and the Rwanda Water and Sewerage Corporation (RWASCO).
 94
  In 2011 the state 
again merged these entities leading to the creation of EWSA as the national body responsible for 
generating capacity, transmission and distribution in Rwanda. The policy-making and planning, 
as well as the development of the renewable energy sector is carried out by the Ministry of 
Infrastructure (Mininfra), whilst the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency (RURA) was 
established in 2001 as the official regulation body for both electricity and petroleum in Rwanda. 
Although there have been changes that have taken place, EWSA is still state run and dependent 
upon government financing and administration. The state subisidises various activities in the 
sector including: paying $6million in subsidies for the rental of fuel generation plants from 
Aggreko, as well as towards the cost of the importation of petroleum for thermal generation.
95
 A 
great portion of the donor aid received by the government of Rwanda is invested by the state into 
the development of the electricity sector. Over the period 2009-2012 the European Union (EU) 
gave approximately €50 million towards the construction of photo-voltaic systems and micro 
hydroelectric power plants for improved rural electrification.
96
 The United Nations Industrial 
Organisation has also funded the construction of three micro hydroelectric power plants.
97
 These 
are only a few of the many initiatives funded by the state through donor aid. The resulting 
outcome has been EWSA’s overreliance on the government and its lack of independence as a 
body. 
Development of the electricity sector is inextricably linked with the government’s overall growth 
strategy. Rwanda’s Vision 2020 highlights the need to economically transform the country, 
improve private sector development and country’s development infrastructure. In order for this 
to be accomplished, generating capacity and supply needs to be increased and made reliable. The 
country’s second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in conjunction with the IMF for the 
period 2008-2012; sets out to increase generating capacity from 45 MW in 2007 to 130 MW by 
2012.
98
 In the country’s own Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) 
2013-2018, improved generating capacity is cited under priority 1, which strives to build the 
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Rwandan economy through investment into infrastructure.
99
 The government aims to raise 
generating capacity to 563 MW by 2017 through the diversification of energy sources (especially 
renewable) and through further development of the legal and regulatory environment (to attract 
foreign investment).  
In addition to this the government has also come up with an even more ambitious Electricity 
Development Strategy 2011-2017 in which it intends to enhance the country’s generating 
capacity to 1000 MW of electricity by 2017 instead of 563 MW.
100
 The planned energy mix is as 
follows: 333 MW of hydroelectric power, 310 MW geothermal power, 300 MW methane gas, 20 
MW diesel and 5 MW generated from a mix of renewable energy sources.
101
  
Despite the sector reforms, participation by the private sector and other potential investors has 
not grown substantially in the period under review. Generation projects are still largely publicly 
funded through the diversion of donor aid funding as mentioned above. This is not a sustainable 
model, especially as the government has limited financial resources. 2011 has however marked 
important changes for the institutional and legal framework of the energy sector in Rwanda. 
Apart from the establishment of EWSA as the national power utility in 2011, the Electricity Law 
was also adopted in June 2011. The law governs over generation, transmission, distribution and 
the trade of electricity and central to the law are four objectives: 
 Liberalisation and regulation of the sector; 
 Development of reliable electricity supply for consumers and the country’s economic 
sectors; 
 Creating an enabling environment for investment; 
 Promotion of fair competition in the sector.102 
Apart from the changes brought about by the Electricity Law there have been various other 
important legal changes. In 2006 Rwanda Investment Law to encourage greater private sector 
investment was introduced and in 2008 specialised commercial courts established to better 
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facilitate the legal process around investment in the country at all levels.
103
 Alongside the courts, 
the government brought in expert judges from Mauritius (one of the top performers with regards 
to attracting foreign investors on the continent) to further develop the commercial legal 
framework in the country.
104
  
 
Figure 6: Generating capacity in Rwanda in kWh per capita 
 
Figure 6 shows that the generation output of Rwanda starts to grow from the early 2000s, 
coinciding with the government-led initiatives to develop the electricity sector further. From 
2005 the generating capacity per capita shows an undisturbed upward trajectory, capturing the 
on-going growth in the country. The gains made in the country’s electricity generating capacity 
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appear to be exceptional however this needs to be tempered with the fact that the country was in 
essence recovering to its generating capacity level in 1990, prior to the knock on effects of the 
Civil War and Genocide. Prior to this Rwanda’s generating capacity had not shown a stable 
record since 1990, although a general pattern of decline from 1995 is observed with the 
generation falling from a peak of 28.60 kWh per capita in 1995 to an all time low of 9.83 kWh 
per capita in 2004. The decline of the country’s generating capacity between 1995-2004 mirrors 
the time in which Rwanda’s political institutions were fragmented and under-developed as a 
combined result of the Civil war in the country which underminded both the executive authority 
and the rule of law in Rwanda. During this period much of the international support coming into 
Rwanda, was linked to relief donor aid.  
Rwanda’s generating capacity pattern over the period under study has to a great extent 
corresponded with the political climate in the country. During the years of political conflict and 
resultant lack of institutional organisation, generating capacity was volatile and then sharply 
declined. After the country’s first “democratic” elections and the introduction of a new 
constitution, the generating capacity responded in growth a few years later. Rwanda’s generating 
capacity although not exceptional has been steadily growing, disturbed only by periods of 
drought. What is notable about the generating capacity growth in Rwanda is that it has not been 
driven by private investment but rather it has been driven by foreign donor and investment by the 
government itself- which may contribute to explaining why the growth has been moderate. The 
institutional reforms that have been taking place in the country from mid 2000s may eventually 
also start to yield higher generating capacity as investors start to respond to the credibility that 
these reforms might bring. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter four has traced the progression of Rwanda’s political constraints and electricity 
generating capacity. The country’s political dispensation has been largely informed by a history 
of political and ethnic violence. The impacts of authoritarian rule have also not yielded high 
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generating capacity outputs for the country. Chapter five will provide an equally informative 
analysis of the situation in Kenya.  
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CHAPTER V 
KENYA, A MARRIAGE OF CORRUPTION AND INVESTMENT 
 
Kenya has been a democracy since 1992 although it has not been considered as a model 
democratic state in Africa owing to reasons of political violence and rife corruption. In spite of 
this, the statistical analysis in chapter 3 showed the country to be doing relatively well in its 
electricity generating capacity. This chapter traces the country’s political constraints and 
electricity generating capacity variables to test the country’s performance against the study’s 
hypothesis. I begin the chapter with a brief country overview, followed by an analysis of the 
country’s political landscape through 1990-201, followed by an assessment of the country’s 
generation sector. The outcomes of this chapter and those presented in chapter 4, on Rwanda will 
be used to conclude overall study findings in chapter 6. 
 
COUNTRY OVERVIEW AND HISTORY 
Kenya is a former British Colony situated in East Africa. The country is well-endowed with 
areas of arable land that are well suited to farming; this is evident in agriculture being a high 
income generator for the country and the success of the country’s tea, coffee and horticultural 
commodities.
105
 The services and industrial sectors are other prominent sectors in Kenya’s 
economy. Apart from these the country is not rich in other natural resources. Kenya is an 
important player in the East Africa region and boasts the largest economy in the EAC. With 
regards to electricity, Kenya has managed to grow its electricity sector since the 1990s however 
large gaps still exist and more needs to be done to secure the country’s supply, especially since 
electricity drives economic activity. The country is also a member of the East Africa Power Pool 
(EAPP) which was established in 2005.  
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Kenya gained its independence in 1963 after a decade long violent liberation struggle, fought 
between the colonial rulers and the Mau Mau activists. Under colonialism the country had a large 
white settler population which led to the dislocation of native Kenyans from their land, the land 
question in Kenya has significantly shaped the political landscape of the country and has also 
deepened the ongoing ethnic divisions within the country. In 1964 Kenya became a republic with 
a new constitution under Jomo Kenyatta. By 1964, president Kenyatta had amended the 1963 
constitution to enhance his power and that of the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU), as well 
as transforming Kenya into a one party state.
106
 These steps marked the beginning of a 14 year 
authoritarian and predatory Nairobi government under Kenyatta and other future leaders. 
In 1978 Daniel arap Moi assumed presidency after the death of Kenyatta. During his rule, Moi 
like his predecessor continued to make constitutional amendments that protected his role as 
president and banned the formation of any political opposition to the one party state. Moi’s reign 
was characterised by high levels of corruption in which state resources were distributed amongst 
his party loyalists (political and business elites, as well as members of his own ethnic group the 
Kalenjin).
107
 President Moi also made use of private gangs and brutal force as a source of private 
protection and a deterrent against any political opposition; scholars such as Susanne Mueller 
have argued that this has been one of the factors that have contributed to the political violence in 
the country.
108
 Moi’s hold on power was extreme and even after calls for political reform in the 
early 1990s (as the wave of democracy swept across Africa) Moi clung to power and was 
reluctant to open Kenya up to multiparty democracy.
109
  
 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN KENYA 
During the 1990s, Kenya underwent several political changes as the country attempted to 
implement multiparty democracy. This form of governance was promoted as the key to improved 
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economic performance, increased foreign investment and donor agency support.
110
 The decade 
was marked by significant political chaos as the old guard clung to power, whilst emerging 
parties seeking change emerged and mobilised.  
In 1992, after much international pressure from civil society groups and coercion through the 
withdrawal of donor aid into the country; Kenya took part in only its second multiparty elections 
since 1964. The much anticipated elections were won by the incumbent president Moi and 
proved to be of limited victory for the country’s political liberalisation as Moi continued to 
repress true political transformation throughout the 1990s. The introduction of multiparty 
democracy in Kenya failed to bring about institutional consolidation. Kenya’s transition to 
democracy was marred by the heightened looting and expropriation of state resources by Moi 
and his senior cabinet members, as their political futures grew uncertain. Although corruption 
and expropriation of public resources had always featured in Kenyan political life the 
Goldenberg Scandal under Moi’s presidency between 1990 and 1993, highlights the peak of 
corruption.
111
 Up to US$600 million, the equivalent of 10 per cent of the Kenyan GDP at the 
time was looted by senior government members under the pretense of exporting diamonds and 
gold.
112
 Nasong’o (2007) puts forward the argument that Kenya is an example of a country that 
has undergone political liberalisation, however, it has failed to transform its political institutions 
and processes accordingly, resulting in the continued authoritarian and corrupt rule of the 
government.
113
 
After the elections there was a large internal and international call for a review of the constitution 
to be made since under the current constitution Moi had absolute authority over the country. The 
country’s democratic institutions including the judiciary, legislature and parliament had also 
effectively collapsed with regards to: their independence, administration and the enforcement of 
rules.
114
 The events taking place in Kenya during the 1990s were reminiscent of the argument 
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advanced by Bates that political liberalisation has a somewhat de-stabilising effect upon 
countries often leading to more political disorder.
115
 In the case of Kenya however the lack of 
genuine support by the president for full political liberalisation is probably a more accurate 
reason for the continued political disorder and predation of state resources. Moi’s acceptance of 
multi-partyism was strongly linked to his fear of losing power should he not concede to political 
reform albeit even just the procedural minimum.
116
 In 1997 again, the KANU party under Moi 
was re-elected. This would be Moi’s final term in office as he was constitutionally barred from 
running for a third term in the upcoming 2002 election; he later ceded leadership of the KANU 
party to Uhuru Kenyatta.  
 
Political conditions from 2000 
The decade starting in 2000 has been characterised by change in political leadership and the 
consolidation of political reform, amidst an environment of electoral violence, dissent in 
leadership and high party turnover. 
The 2002 Kenyan elections were a landmark moment for the country, as for the first time in its 
history power would be held by another party other than KANU.  Mwai Kibaki of the National 
Alliance of Kenya, alongside Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) won 
the elections under their coalition party the National Rainbow Alliance (NARC). The two 
politicians had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which stated that should the 
party win the elections the constitution would be amended to include the role of prime minister, 
which Odinga would accede to.
117
 A year into the coalition however, Kibaki and Odinga could 
not reach agreement on the constitutional review process, a point which led Odinga to leave the 
coalition party and create tension between the two leaders. 
During his tenure Kibaki moved the country towards economic recovery as he advanced 
liberalist policies that were aimed at attracting local and international investment into the 
country. Economic growth was experienced in the services, agriculture and infrastructure sectors. 
Under Kibaki Kenya became the leading East African economy and managed to expand its 
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business presence into neighbouring countries. In spite of the country’s substantial gains 
economically, political corruption continued to undermine the Kibaki government.  Corruption 
has been an enduring feature of Kenyan politics since independence and since the spoils of 
presidential incumbency are equated with benefits to members of the same ethnic group, politics 
is a high stakes and ethnically divided game in Kenya. Kibaki’s tenure was no different in this 
regard and eventually led to some of the country’s donors and financers withdrawing funding 
into the country over corruption allegations.
118
  
In the aftermath of the 2007 elections, violence broke-out across the country after Kibaki was 
declared president again in a highly contested and irregular election campaign. Kenya has always 
had a history of post-election violence since 1992 with the exception of its 2002 elections. It is 
noted however that none of the previous incidents of violence were comparable to the months of 
chaos going into 2008. The violence left approximately 1000 dead and another 100 000 people 
internally displaced from their homes.
119
 The violence was finally ended when Mwai Kibaki of 
the Party of National Unity (PNU) and Raila Odinga of the ODM signed the 2008 Kenya 
National Accord which brokered peace between the two leaders and resulted in a power sharing 
government.  
 
Political institutions 
Much of the focus on Kenya’s democracy has been placed on the electoral process and less 
attention has been paid to the substantive nature of democracy, for example the presence and 
quality of political institutions, as well as to what extent these institutions are effective. This 
could be said to stem from the 1992 electoral process whereby Kenya finally adopted a 
multiparty system, however, very few changes were made constitutionally or institutionally to 
reflect the changes. The failure to make constitutional and institutional changes that reflected the 
new political dispensation meant that “democratic ideals” and the plethora of newly emerging 
political parties operated parallel to the prevailing one-party ideology. Khadiagala says of the 
                                                          
118
 Gray Phombeah. “Corruption Haunts Kenya’s Leader.” BBC News, 23 February 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4288595.stm  
119 Peter Kagwanja and Roger Southall. Kenya: A Democracy in Retreat? (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
55 | P a g e  
 
state in Kenya that “despite the multiparty dispensation, executive dominance continued to 
impede the maturation of parliamentary democracy.”120 
After a long and tumultuous process of constitutional review and reform, which in 2005 led to 
the split between Kibaki and Odinga, a new constitution was finally established in 2010. 
Important features of the new constitution include: a greater separation of powers between the 
executive, judiciary and legislature; improved checks upon the executive; increasing the role of 
parliament and the devolution of power to the country’s 47 counties.121 The constitution is 
structured as follows: there is a bicameral parliament made up of a senate and a national 
assembly; a judiciary which is elected by the judicial services commission (pointing towards a 
level of independence from the executive) and a multiparty society, with several opposition 
parties contesting elections freely.
122
 Overall the democratic constitutional reforms which have 
taken place in Kenya have created an environment in which the rule of law and government 
policy take precedent and provide a framework for government credibility over the long term. 
This is in spite of the tendency of political parties in Kenya to form and break weak coalitions, 
which in itself is a practice that has a de-stabilising effect on party politics and consolidation. 
Figure 7 traces the path of political constraints in Kenya. From 1990-1992 the graph shows 
Kenya as being rated with zero constraints which correspond with the period in which the 
country was still a one party state under Moi. From 1993 the country’s rating rises to 0.43 and 
again in 1998 to 0.4, again these changes correspond with the introduction of multi-party 
democracy. There is a slight decline in 2003 lasting through to 2008. When calculating the 
proportion of years that the country has had political constraints in place through 1990-2011, 
Kenya scores a high of 0.87, much higher than the regional average of 0.53.  
The political events of Kenya in the 1990s moving into the 2000s highlight the disorder, 
tendency towards politico-ethnic violence and predation of public resources in Kenyan politics. 
Furthermore, politics in the country have always been framed under the personality of the 
incumbent leader. Branch and Cheeseman, expose the lack of institutional safeguards within 
                                                          
120
 Gilbert Khadiagala, op cit, 71.   
121
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.  “An Investment Guide to Kenya.”  
http://www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2012d2_en.pdf , 2012, 7.  
122
 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book.  
56 | P a g e  
 
Kenya as a result of the despotic rule of political leaders who benefit from the lack of formal 
institutions that would otherwise constrain their political actions.
123
  
 
Figure 7: Political constraints ranking in Kenya (1990-2011) 
 
 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR OVERVIEW 
Like most African countries Kenya suffers from low electrification rates and it is estimated that 
more than 70 per cent of the population is without electricity.
124
 The majority of those connected 
were in the urban areas. The energy sector and particularly electricity is a focal point for the 
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Government of Kenya’s Vision 2030 which aims to attain ‘middle income’ country status 
through pushing for higher levels of industrialism. Electricity is the driver of industrial growth as 
well as overall economic growth and social upliftment. The demand for reliable and affordable 
electricity is high in the country, especially with a burgeoning urban population. The country’s 
electricity mix is made up of: hydroelectric power, geothermal energy, thermal energy and 
increasingly renewable energy sources such as: biomass, solar and wind power. The increase in 
renewable energy sources in the Kenyan power sector are owing to a push towards cleaner 
energy sources that are environmentally conscious and the growing presence of Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs) in the country post 1997.  
 
Hydroelectric power 
Hydroelectric power contributes almost 50 per cent of Kenya’s electricity mix and by the end of 
2011, it was estimated that it accounted for 767 MW (47.8 per cent) of installed generating 
capacity.
125
 The country’s hydroelectric power is located in: Lake Victoria, the Rift Valley, Athis 
River, Tana River and Ewaso Ng’iro North River.126 Apart from the currently known sources of 
hydroelectric power, it is estimated that a further 1449 MW has yet to be developed, which could 
translate to approximately 5605 MWh of electricity annually.
127
 Although often promoted as a 
good source or renewable energy in renewable energy discourse, hydroelectric power also poses 
great risk for developing countries such as Kenya. Kenya is a semi-arid and drought prone 
country, an over-reliance on hydroelectric power by the country could lead to electricity 
shortages during dry weather spells. This has already been witnessed over the period 1998-2000 
and again in 2008 when drought struck the country. Investing into hydroelectric power is also 
very costly due to the expensive type of equipment and hydrology exploration needed upfront 
and the long lead times on the development of a hydroelectric power plant (estimated to be 7-10 
years in Kenya).
128
 Having considered these challenges, the Government of Kenya has made 
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plans to concentrate on other energy sources and reduce the country’s reliance on hydroelectric 
power to 5 per cent of total generating capacity by 2030.
129
 
 
Figure 8: Graph showing Rwanda’s generating capacity by source 
Geothermal electric power 
The development of geothermal electric power has been prioritised by the Government of Kenya 
as a sustainable energy source which is found in abundance in the country’s Rift Valley. They 
have set the goal of making 530 MW of geothermal energy available to come on-stream by 2030. 
It is estimated that approximately 700 MW of geothermal energy are to be found within the 
region, currently the country is only using 198 MW of this type of energy, making up only 13 per 
cent of the total installed generating capacity mix.
130
 There are currently 5 geothermal power 
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stations in the country, 4 of which are owned by the parastatal KenGen and the IPP Orpower 4. 
In line with its ambitions for greater geothermal capacity the government has set up the 
Geothermal Development Company (GDC) to lead exploration and drilling projects in the sector. 
Like hydroelectric power, geothermal energy shares a high capital investment requirement 
upfront particularly as exploration is costly and does not always lead to the discovery of reserves. 
The country also lacks in skilled labour to carry out explorations activities in this sector. 
Olkaria 1 was the first geothermal plant to be built in Africa. Exploration and drilling for 
reserves started in 1986 and were halted in 1993 due to a lack in funds to carry out the 
construction of the plant.
131
 Through the co-finance of KenGen and international development 
agencies (World Bank, the European Bank Investment Bank and KfW Development Bank in 
Germany) the plant was built with a capacity of 45 MW in 2000.
132
 Olkaria 2 generates 105 MW 
and was commissioned in 2010.
 133
 Olkaria 4 is expected to generate 140 MW when it is 
completed and is also being co-financed by KenGen and development agency partners.
 134
 
Olkaria 3 is unique in that it is wholly operated and owned by the IPP OrPower 4, a subsidiary of 
the Israeli owned Ormat Technologies.
 135
 The company was able to secure US$310 million from 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to finance the project which has also been 
insured by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
136
 
 
Thermal electric power 
Thermal generating capacity through the burning of petroleum or natural gas has been in use for 
a long time in Kenya. In 2011 it made up approximately 37 per cent of the country’s total 
installed capacity. Although this type of electricity infrastructure is relatively easy to develop or 
rent from private developers, it is not seen as sustainable for a developing state. Fuel-based 
generation plants require petroleum or diesel and Kenya currently has to import its petroleum 
                                                          
131
 Mega Projects Kenya. “Olkaria Geothermal Expansion Project.” Mega Projects Kenya, 
https://www.megaprojects.co.ke/projects/11/details/olkaria-geothermal-expansion-project/ , 2015: 1.  
132
 Ibid. 
133
 Ibid. 
134
 Ibid. 
135
 Ibid. 
136
 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. “Project Brief.” http://www.miga.org/projects/index.cfm?pid=504  
60 | P a g e  
 
and natural gas, thus making it an expensive fuel source.
137
 Large imports of petroleum and gas 
also place the country’s generation sector in danger of market volatility. Kenya’s strict leaning 
towards cleaner energy and environmental preservation, makes this form of fuel highly 
undesirable and in conflict with the country’s status as a beneficiary of the Programme for 
Scaling Up Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries.
138
 
 
Electricity sector reforms 
Prior to 1996, the electricity sector was controlled entirely by the government under the Kenya 
Power Company (KPC) which had been established in 1954. The country’s power generation 
had in the past been funded through international multilateral and bilateral donors, development 
finance institutions and the World Bank Group. Consider for example the Turkwel Hydro-plant 
that was financed entirely by the French Development Agency in 1991 and remains one of the 
country’s most important sources of hydroelectric power.139  
During the early 1990s a succession of reasons led to the withdrawal of donor aid to the country, 
some of these included: the end of the Cold War (which saw a general decline in aid to Africa as 
a whole), the reluctance of president Moi to move Kenya towards a multiparty democracy, heavy 
state corruption and politically motivated human rights violations. The withdrawal of aid to the 
country put pressure on an already poor electricity sector and by the mid-1990s the government 
saw the urgent need to introduce new measures to improve the country’s generating capacity 
output. Consequently over the period 1995-1997, the electricity sector underwent reform under 
the Electricity Act of 1997, whereby the state sold much of its ownership rights in KPC and 
sought ways in which to increase private-sector investment into generating capacity. 
The reforms led to the unbundling of the state utility KPC, therefore giving birth to:  
 The Ministry of Energy (MOE), responsible for all policy-making on energy issues 
including electricity and petroleum; 
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 Electricity Regulatory Board (ERB), responsible for the monitoring and regulation of 
pricing/tariffs, licenses and consumer protection; 
 Kenya Generating Company Limited (KenGen) a majority state-owned entity which 
provides approximately 80 per cent of Kenya’s generation needs using various fuel 
sources; 
  Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC), a fully owned state entity responsible for 
purchase, distribution and transmission of electricity; 
 The participation of six IPPs in the generation of electricity.140 
Most considerably the reforms saw the Kenyan government opening up the generation of 
electricity to private investors both locally and internationally for the construction, ownership 
and operation of power plants under the IPP system. In 1996 the Nairobi government sent out a 
tender for two diesel power plants of a 46 MW and 44 MW capacity, this led to the introduction 
of Kenya’s first two IPPs: Westmont (Malaysian owned private investors) and Iberafrica 
(Spanish owned private investors).
141
 These agreements were made under the new Energy Act.
142
 
By 1998 a second round of tenders was opened for the construction of a 100 MW geothermal 
power plant, which was won by OrPower4 and a second 75 MW diesel generating power plant, 
which was won by Tsavo Power in 2000.
143
 The Kipevu, plant under Tsavo Power came on-
stream in 2001, coinciding with the country’s recovery from electricity shortages as a result of 
the 1998 drought.
144
 The Kipevu power plant is also seen as one of the most successful IPP plant 
projects in Kenya as funding for it was endorsed by the World Bank and the European 
Investment Bank. This was a showcase of the possibility of collaboration on investment into 
costly utilities and highlighting investor confidence in the credibility of the Kenyan government 
and IPP system. Less favoured was the third round of IPP tenders issued in 1999 as an urgent 
response to the 1998 drought in which hydroelectric power scarcity led electricity shortages and 
subsequent blackouts. This round of IPPs was for three diesel fueled power plants to 
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immediately start feeding into the national grid and was not well-received due to the high tariff 
costs that were associated with this type of generation. 
Over the period 1996 to 2013, Kenya has conducted twelve power purchase agreements with 
IPPs amounting to the value of 1194 MW of electricity from varying fuel sources.
145
 The 
introduction of the IPP process has helped to improve Kenya’s generating capacity, especially as 
the demand for electricity intensifies with the country’s growing economic status. Much of the 
IPP success would not have been possible without the institutional reforms and enabling 
environment set out by the ERB. Kenya’s political instability, high levels of corruption and 
substantial financial requirements for investment have all aggravated the risks to potential 
investors.  Despite these circumstances however, the country has been able to secure private 
investment through the IPP model and necessary sector reform which has diminished the role of 
the state in the energy sector. The IPP process that has emerged out of the energy sector reform’s 
process has been central to the overall growth of generating capacity in the country. In 2013, 
Norton Rose Fulbright acknowledged Kenya as having one of the “most well-established power 
sectors in sub-Saharan Africa” and IPP procurement programme.146 
The new coalition government under Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga in 2002 was under 
immense pressure to improve economic growth after years of a stagnant economy under Moi.  
One of the ways in which they initiated economic growth was through further improvements to 
the electricity generating sector, as it is the key to unlocking economic productivity. In 2004 the 
government produced Sessional Paper 4, which lays out a deeper reform policy framework for 
the country’s energy sector. In 2006 this policy was realised under the Energy Act of 2006. The 
act has three 3 pillars: to reduce the cost of generating capacity and therefore make electricity 
more affordable, improve electricity service (including a higher rollout of rural electrification) 
and to increase private sector participation in the generation sector.
147
 The 2006 Act also saw the 
dissolution of the ERB, which was replaced by the Electricity Regulatory Commission (ERC). 
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Most importantly the Energy Act is the principal law governing the electricity sector and its 
work is independently carried out by the ERC.  
 
 
Figure 9: Generating capacity in Kenya in kWh per capita 
 
Despite there being mixed sentiments regarding the performance of Kenya’s electricity sector 
over the past few years, the generating capacity has certainly been on an upward trajectory and 
has far surpassed the 1990 starting point of the average per capita 138.85 kWh to 181.26 kWh in 
2011.
148
 Figure 9 shows that prior to 1995 generating capacity in the country was not stable, 
however from 1990 it starts to take off fairly steadily until 1998, when drought strikes and leads 
to a sharp decline. The year 2000 is the turning point for generation and from there significant 
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gains are made, coinciding with the new political leadership under Kibaki and his aggressive 
liberalist development plans to increase private sector participation in the economy. By about 
2005 the country has surpassed its pre-drought levels and continues to grow steadily. Kenya’s 
high performance in generating capacity comes amidst a challenging political climate. 
 Kenya’s generating capacity over the period 1990-2011, has been impressive and shown 
immense resilience in the midst of heavy state corruption and sporadic political violence 
(especially after the 2007 elections). These events have challenged the fibre of Kenya’s 
democracy and have weakened the position of the political institutions in the country which 
through these challenges have been shown as unable to fully constrain the behaviour of the 
executive. The presence of the institutions, even if weak has contributed to the prevention of an 
overt disregard for the rule of law and temptation for authoritarian practice in the country. Thus 
the institutions though weak have contributed to the government gaining a moderate record of 
credibility, which goes some way into explaining Kenya’s impressive ability to attract 
investment into the country and see meaningful generating capacity growth to the tune of 30.54 
per cent over the period under review.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter five has traced the progression of both the political constraints and electricity generating 
capacity of Kenya, highlighting key reasons for the country’s positive performance. In chapter 
six I bring together the evidence from both chapter five and six in a discussion over the 
implications for the findings which have been made.  
  
65 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER SIX 
COMPARING RWANDA AND KENYA 
The aim of this research paper has been to tease out the discussion that the presence of political 
institutions within a country impacts upon the electricity generating capacity of that country. In 
this chapter I bring together the statistical analysis and qualitative case study outcomes of the 
paper in order to consider the significance of the research findings and determine the 
implications thereof.  
 
 
FINDINGS ON RWANDA 
Rwanda has managed to pull itself out of the brink of state failure, to emerge as an important 
economy within East Africa alongside Kenya. The country’s economic success is attributed to 
Kagame’s tight state control and developmental aims. In 2012 The Economist labeled Rwanda 
“Africa’s Singapore” in response to president Kagame’s ambitious developmental policies.  
During his tenure Kagame has steered the Rwandan economy towards impressive economic 
growth through various national development strategies such as: Vision 2020. In return the 
country has come to be highly rated on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business  indices, has 
achieved significant levels of economic growth (8 per cent in 2011) and remains a darling  of 
foreign aid donors. Kagame has embedded a culture of development by modernising the African 
state (pushing for growth in the tertiary sectors and pulling away from agriculture), as well as 
through aggressive jostling for private sector participation in the economy. Kagame’s 
government holds economic growth as the key to an improved quality of social life in Rwanda.  
At the level of the electricity generation sector, the central control employed by president 
Kagame seems to have provided a moderately stable and guided environment for the growth of 
this critical sector. Chapter 5 traces the state led reforms that have been made to create a more 
investor friendly environment in the energy sector through the introduction of PPAs, commercial 
legal reforms, clearer contract agreement terms as well as potential tax incentives for foreign 
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investors. Although the country has not experienced high levels of private investment into 
generating capacity, it has secured some meaningful projects such as the KivuWatt power plant; 
a first in its kind methane extraction project to the sum of more than US$100 million with the 
American based Contour Global. KivuWatt was Rwanda’s first IPP in 2009 and remains one of 
the country’s largest. 
In the face of all of its accolades, Rwanda still remains a sizeable political risk to potential and 
current investment partners. The country is an authoritarian state in which the executive has 
absolute control over public affairs, to the point of overshadowing the political institutions which 
were put in place with the new constitution in 2003. Rwanda’s constitution provides for the 
presence of an independent and separate executive, judiciary and legislature, however the de 
facto reality is that all of these institutions fall under the influence of president Kagame. The 
Kagame administration goes unhindered in the exercise of its discretion and political will, 
evoking North and Weingast’s concern that if a state has a comparative advantage over political 
power, there is no measure of control to prevent it from acting unreliably and extracting all 
available resources.
149
 The lack of genuine political institutions in Rwanda is squarely at odds 
with the prospect of government credibility and investment attraction. 
Apart from the clear ineffectual presence of democratic political institutions under the Rwandan 
constitution, another factor contributing to the country’s poor political stability is the lack of 
multiparty participation in the political life of the country. Since the country’s first “democratic” 
elections in 2003, official party opposition has been suppressed through the use of political 
violence, the assassination of political figures has also been rife and the covert use of persecution 
under the suspicion of being a genocidaire (a political tool against dissenters). The lack of 
political party participation and variation within Rwandan government institutions strips away 
another of the veto points that Henisz has set out as being useful in determining the degree of 
political constraint that a country is able to exercise over its executive. For both investors and 
donor agencies the suppression of democratic participation and the human rights violations 
emanating from this oppression are unfavourable for ongoing support to the country.
150
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Under a developmental authoritarian system, investors lack the certainty of a long term security 
that is found in an institutionally sound democracy, this is due to the fact that institutions once 
established and appropriately functioning are far more difficult to change or break-down since 
institutional reform is a long and gradual process. The presence of democracy creates a system in 
which the power of the government is dissolved across the institutions within that democracy, 
therefore making policy change and reneging on prior commitments especially difficult.
151
 
Contrary to this, rules and norms stemming from a political figurehead tend to have less 
longevity and are highly subject to change since as Olson rightly argues authoritarian states are 
vulnerable to succession issues as well as short time horizon incentives; these are both ends that 
inhibit investor confidence.
152
  
Rwanda is highly dependent upon foreign aid assistance which makes up in the range of 30 per 
cent-40 per cent of its budget;
153
 such a reliance on aid highlights the country’s own inability to 
raise sufficient levels of income to meet the country’s budgetary requirements. Heavy foreign aid 
is also often accompanied by a concentration of donor agency policies and requirements, which 
may or may not undermine the political and domestic strategies of a country, depending on 
whether a government is able to harmonise donor agency policies with the country’s own 
objectives. In the case of Rwanda, the country has been able to work closely with its donors; the 
threat however of the loss of aid is an ever present reality. In 2011, the country started to 
experience a reduction in foreign aid income and the lagged effects of that are starting to become 
evident in the decline of economic growth to 4.7 per cent in 2013.
154
 This declining trend is not 
favourable in the eyes of investors. 
Within the electricity sector itself many reforms to strengthen the performance of the sector and 
to create a more investor friendly environment have yielded some results, however, one of the 
greatest challenges is that the legal framework around commercial (and in this case energy) 
investment is still being developed. It was only in 2011 that the country adopted the Electricity 
Law and started to review the legal commercial environment in Rwanda. Untested legal policies 
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and procedures pose a heightened risk to investors as the framework is unclear and there are no 
precedents set against which to evaluate the credibility of the legislative and judicial institutions 
of the country; North and Weingast (1987) and Shepsle (1991) highlight in their works that a 
country’s precedence of behaviour is one way in which to determine the existence of credible 
commitment and Rwanda lacks such a precedence. 
 A legal debacle between Dane Associates Limited (Dane) and the government of Rwanda 
provides a good example of the uncertainty of the country’s legal framework around energy 
sector investment. In 2005 the Rwandan government concluded a contract with Dane (trading as 
Kibuye Power 1 Limited in Rwanda) for the production of a methane gas extraction power plant 
with a generating capacity of 35 MW.
155
 The plant was to be built at Kibuye, along Lake Kivu 
and was to be the first plant to generate electricity from methane gas; the first stage of the project 
would be a 1.2 MW pilot plant to prove the feasibility of the project. After the completion of the 
pilot plant however, the government terminated the contract with Dane without any 
compensation being made to the company, furthermore Dane has also accused the Rwandan 
government of expropriating technological intellectual property regarding generating capacity 
from methane gas.
 156
 In 2009 the government of Rwanda subsequently entered into a new 
contract with the American based Contour Global with the same project specs, this time under 
the KivuWatt Project.
157
 After a lengthy case before the International Chamber of Commerce, 
the government of Rwanda won the case for terminating the contract with Dane Associates 
Limited on the grounds that the company had not disclosed full terms of the project plans.
 158
 
Although the ultimate ruling was in favour of the government of Rwanda the procedure has cast 
a shadow over the predictability and reliability of investment into the country’s electricity sector.  
Another glaring challenge for potential investors into the country’s electricity sector is the strong 
presence of the state within the sector. The electricity sector has traditionally been under state 
control in Africa and many other developing states, owing to the large economies of scale and 
massively consumed outputs of the sector, both factors that have motivated government interest, 
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making it particularly vulnerable to the problem of credible commitment.
159
 The underlying logic 
of credible commitment informs us that private investment is unlikely to take place where there 
exists a strong unchecked government control over resources. In Rwanda the state centralization 
makes government involvement inevitable and both EWSA and RURA remain fully under the 
control of the state financially and in the policy-making process.  
Rwanda’s lack of democracy and adherence to its own constitutionally set institutions raises 
questions in the country’s credibility to keep commitments; the executive is unchecked and his 
political influence is present across all state levels.  Although there has been private sector 
participation in the electricity sector, it has been limited and possibly reflective of the uncertainty 
around the country’s own long term political stability and the uncertainty of the legal framework 
and avenues to recourse in the country. Despite the country being able to record a growth of 13 
per cent over two decades, at approximately 27.93 kWh per capita in 2011 this is still very poor.  
 
 
FINDINGS ON KENYA 
Over the period 1990-2011 Kenya underwent significant changes in its political landscape. At 
the start of the period the country was under the authoritarian rule of Daniel arap Moi and a one-
party state. By the end of the study period, Kenya had evolved into an active multiparty 
democracy under the joint leadership of Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga. Kenya’s remarkable 
political transformation has not been a smooth one however, especially if recalling the instances 
of political violence in the 1992, 1997 and most seriously in the 2008 elections. Despite the 
challenges that exist for the country’s democracy, Kenya has been widely viewed as a “haven of 
stability and prosperity in eastern Africa.”160 The country has performed well economically and 
is the largest economy within the EAC, representing 40 per cent of the regional body’s GDP.161 
Kenya enjoys its influential role as a result of high levels of private sector investment and 
                                                          
159
 Ibid, 19. 
160
 The Economist. “For All its Flaws, an Example to Others.” The Economist, 19 December 2007. 
http://www.economist.com/node/10328986  
161
  MWangi Kimenyi and Josephine Kibe. “Africa’s Powerhouse.” Brookings. 6 January, 2014. 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/30-kenya-economy-kimenyi  
70 | P a g e  
 
participation in the economy and the presence of a sound banking system; all of which are 
features that were introduced through Kibaki’s liberal market approach adopted in 2002.  
Kenya’s economic success and favourable position as a leading east African economy is bundled 
together with a somewhat “messy” political track record. Kenya has been an active multiparty 
democracy since 1992, with a record of regular and relatively free elections. In 2002, the first 
political transfer of power from KANU to the coalition government under Kibaki and Odinga 
took place. These peaceful elections, confirmed Kenya’s status as committed to democracy and 
the rule of law. Most importantly the country has a well defined constitution which has clearly 
set out the political institutions of the country and has actively sought to minimise the discretion 
of the executive. As a bare minimum, Kenya meets the requirements of Henisz’s political 
constraint’s index through the presence of political institutions, a clear separation of powers and 
evidence of a moderate culture of adherence to the prescriptions of these institutions and the rule 
of law.   
Unlike its Rwandan counterpart, Kenya has embraced the active participation of political parties 
within the country’s political life. In fact it might be said that the country’s openness to political 
parties has been somewhat too liberal as nearly 300 political parties emerged on the eve of the 
2007 elections.
162
 This is indicative of a more deeply seated problem in the political party 
environment of Kenya. Parties in Kenya have traditionally mushroomed prior to election periods 
and have gone on to form weak coalitions amongst each other with the aim of securing 
presidency. More than just a political outcome, this is reflective of the high stakes placed on 
politics in the country as is discussed in chapter four. This phenomenon has a distinctly de-
stabilising impact upon the country’s political life and has been described as impeding on 
democratic consolidation by Khadiagala.
163
 So although Henisz speaks of political variation 
being a desired feature of a government that is able to exercise political constraints, in the case of 
Kenya it is evident that too much variation (of especially weakly formed political parties) is also 
a hindrance to political performance.   
 Despite a framework for political institutions in place, a political landscape open to competition 
and more than two decades since the inception of multiparty democracy, Kenya has struggled to 
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distinguish itself as truly governed by its institutions and laws. This is notably evident in the 
country’s struggle with corruption and politically motivated violence.  
Throughout the country’s history, the expropriation of public resources has plagued the Nairobi 
government. This has been a culture which was embedded through the leadership styles of 
Kenyatta and Moi who both cultivated ethnically based patronage systems as a means to garner 
support and appease political elites. Although there have been no further cases of corruption on 
the scale of the Goldenberg Scandal in the early 1990s, the country continues to rank poorly on 
international corruption scales. The fact that politics in Kenya is viewed as a high stakes game in 
which the winner is able to amass significant wealth for himself and his patron clients is deeply 
problematic for the consolidation of the rule of law. Chabal and Daloz’s interpretation of African 
states being run as extensions of personal life where the executive of a country fails to 
distinguish between personal and public redistribution of resources, rings true in part for 
Kenya.
164
 Although having political constraints in place, these are paired with a weak democratic 
culture in the country which has the overall result of failing to restrain government behaviour. 
Instead of being constrained and guided by its institutions, members of Kenya’s executive have 
worked within the institutional framework of the weak democracy to secure political spoils for 
themselves and party elites as suggested by Chabal and Daloz analogy of a neo-patrimonial state.  
Although the history of serious politico-ethnic violence is behind the country with the last major 
uprising being the 2008 post election violence, ethnic tension still exists and continues to be a 
feature of political life as many of the country’s parties still mobilise along ethnic lines. In spite 
of all of these inhibiting political factors, Kenya has managed to develop a sound power sector, 
even labeled as the most well established in sub-Saharan Africa by Norton Rose Fulbright.
165
   
From the case study analysis, the defining feature for the success of the Kenyan power sector 
thus far has been the IPP system whereby private investors tender for bids set out by the Ministry 
of Energy. Investors then build, operate and own the projects over the agreed contractual terms. 
The IPP sector has been seen as successful in Kenya because the regulation of the sector has 
been clearly defined through the Sessional Paper No.4 in 2004, subsequently followed by the 
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Energy Act of 2006.
166
 Kenya’s broader liberal market approach has also substantially helped to 
promote the sector to external investors, alongside the precedent of having concluded twelve 
PPAs between the period 1996 and 2013. What’s more is that the Kenyan government although 
not directly involved in generating capacity, partially owns KenGen which has an 80 per cent 
market share in generating capacity and promotes competition with IPPs in the country. Though 
not concluded as yet, KenGen has also hinted at the possibility of going into generation 
partnerships with IPPs, especially in geothermal energy procurement as it is a high risk and cost 
sector.  
The political performance and identity of Kenya is a complex one, which has led to the Kenyan 
government gaining a moderate level of credibility in the eyes of investors though the issues 
around corruption and sporadic political violence do temper investor confidence in the country. 
In spite of its challenges, the executive has been able to put in place a sound power sector which 
has set a precedent through the numerous PPAs commissioned and with the strong participation 
of financial development agencies. Kenya’s generation performance though falling short of 
where it is estimated to rank according to the empirical analysis is still fairly impressive and 
further qualitative findings suggest that the sector is set to improve over the coming years.  
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The research findings from both the empirical and qualitative analysis show that countries that 
have political institutions in place will perform up to two times better than countries that lack in 
these institutions completely. The case study countries of Kenya and Rwanda presented a 
particularly tough test for the hypothesis that the presence of political institutions leads to higher 
electricity generating capacity. Kenya although a democracy with political institutions in place, 
is inconsistent with its political performance and is battered by state corruption and sporadic 
political violence. Rwanda has a developmental political approach which has enabled economic 
gains but it lacks the presence of meaningful political institutions. Essentially both cases have 
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less than perfect consolidation of their political institutions and the executives of each country do 
not seem to be adequately constrained by the presence of these institutions. 
Kenya as a democracy of weak institutions and with a higher proportion of years with political 
constraints in place outperforms Rwanda both statistically and when traced in the nested 
analysis. Kenya has concluded several PPAs with private investors in the generation sector and 
has also managed to establish a widely successful IPP process and environment which has been 
endorsed by international financial institutions. The IPP environment of Kenya has also set a 
precedent for itself as reliable and investor friendly through established legal frameworks. In 
spite of its political challenges, the weak democratic institutions of Kenya have managed to paint 
the Nairobi government as a credible partner with which investors can engage with. This has 
subsequently led to gains in the generating capacity of the country and confirmed the hypothesis 
that political constraints lead to higher generating capacity. 
By contrast Rwanda’s authoritarian leadership though with its highly developmental outlook, 
which some will argue is far more useful to investors than just the state of political institutions, 
has performed weakly in generating capacity. Throughout the period 1990-2011, the country has 
only recorded KivuWatt as a financially significant private investment into the electricity sector- 
all other projects have been aid funded or through the Kagame government. This is in line with 
the statistical finding that countries with little or limited political constraints are most likely to 
fall up to two times behind countries such as Kenya which have institutional restraints in place in 
their generating capacity. Rwanda’s authoritarian regime has mostly failed to gain credibility as a 
reliable investment partner, a factor reflected in the country’s low generating capacity.  
The evidence suggests that political institutions which are able to constrain the behaviour of their 
executive lead to higher generating capacity. What is interesting is that these institutions need 
not be particularly strong or with a high record of success as is the case in Kenya but merely 
having them in place, improves the credibility rating of a country. Before this can be concluded 
definitively, however more studies around this and including a wider selection of case study 
countries could provide a more insightful answer.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has analysed the relationship between the presence of democratic political institutions 
and electricity generating capacity outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa, in order to address the 
question whether or not the presence of these institutions contribute to higher generating capacity 
regionally. The analysis has been informed by the theory of credible commitment emerging from 
the new institutional economics. The theory views political institutions as a regulatory and 
enforcement mechanism to limit the discretion held by governments to make arbitrary choices 
and to hold governments accountable to their contractual agreements with investors. In essence a 
government that is credible creates an environment that is conducive to investment by 
minimising the range of political risk, therefore reducing transactions costs for investors and 
attracting greater investment. 
The initial cross-national statistical analysis shows that there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the presence of political constraints and electricity generating 
capacity in sub-Saharan Africa. Countries that have institutions which are able to constrain the 
behaviour of the executive are expected to generate up to two times more electricity than other 
countries. Using the statistical analysis as a guide for country selection for further case study 
analysis to test the validity of my initial findings, I selected two East African countries: Kenya 
and Rwanda. 
The countries varied on their political constraints with Kenya exhibiting the presence of 
democratic political institutions over a greater proportion of years in the period 1990-2011. 
Rwanda on the other hand lacked institutions for most of the same period. Tracing the 
relationship of the independent and dependent variables in the case study, confirmed the results 
of the statistical analysis and consequently the hypothesis that countries with political constraints 
induce credibility in their government, helping it to make credible commitments to investors and 
expand generating capacity. 
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The case study analysis also revealed that commitment to the democratic electoral process and 
the presence of genuine multipartyism in a country alongside political institutions (even if only 
moderately entrenched into the society as in Kenya), improves a country’s credibility.  
The outcomes of my study give reason to support the theory that democracy goes some way into 
improving the development outcomes of a country. Democratic political institutions as a result of 
their ability to limit the discretion of a government and put in place enforcement mechanisms 
against reneging enhance a country’s reputation for being reliable and trustworthy in contractual 
agreements. These are all factors that reduce political risk and help to make a country more 
attractive to investment which is positively linked with economic growth and development.  
Other issues of interest raised by the study that could potentially lead to further research include 
the extent to which partnerships with regional and international financial and development 
agencies could work to enhance the investment profile of a country. Both Kenya and Rwanda 
have relationships with these types of agencies, however Kenya seems to have successfully 
capitalised on these partnerships through its IPP process.  
Finally with regards to the discussion on democracy and development, there seems to be a clear 
case for democracy as leading to development outcomes because even if moderately adopted and 
enforced, as has been the case in Kenya, democracy still delivers a higher level of development 
outcomes than the absence of it. This finding is especially important in Africa with its assortment 
of democratic culture. It suggests that African states even if not having in place the full 
prescription of democratic political institutions as promoted by the Weberian understanding of 
statehood and institutions, could still derive developmental benefit from having in place a hybrid 
variant of democracy. 
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